

Message Text

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CHEROKEE FOR THE AMB FM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG, US, XF

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO DAYAN ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

1. WHEN DAYAN GETS BACK YOU SHOULD SEE HIM IMMEDIATELY
AND CONVEY FOLLOWING TO HIM AS A MESSAGE FROM ME.

-- SAM LEWIS HAS INFORMED ME OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU
BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE ABROAD. WITH RESPECT TO THE QUES-
TIONS ON WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE COMMITMENTS FROM SADAT, LET
ME FIRST SAY THAT I BELIEVE WE CAN PROVIDE ANSWERS TO SOME
OF THEM ON THE BASIS OF THE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH
SADAT. SADAT HAS IN ALL CASES GIVEN US THESE INDICATIONS
OF FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS OF THEIR CONDITIONALITY ON A
"STRONG" DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, BY WHICH HE MEANS ONE
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THAT CONTAINS MORE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL THAN IS
CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 242.

-- SADAT HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO US PRIVATELY (HE HAS NOW
SAID THE SAME THING PUBLICLY) THAT THE ASWAN FORMULA WOULD
BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

-- SADAT HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HE CAN ACCEPT BORDER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FINAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE WEST BANK (ALWAYS USING THE ADJECTIVE "MINOR" TO QUALIFY THESE).

HE HAS ALSO NOW MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ALONG SIMILAR LINES (OCTOBER INTERVIEW OF APRIL 2).

-- WITH RESPECT TO HIS ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA, SADAT HAS TOLD US THAT IF HE CAN GET A "STRONG" DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, AND IF KING HUSSEIN REFUSES TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS BASIS, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY WITH ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE A WEST BANK/GAZA AGREEMENT.

-- ON ISRAELI TROOP PRESENCE IN WEST BANK, SADAT HAS INDICATED HE COULD ACCEPT THIS DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD BUT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING CONCRETE TO US ABOUT THE PERIOD BEYOND.

-- THESE ARE QUITE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACH TO GETTING FIRM ANSWERS FROM SADAT ON THEM. AT THE SAME TIME I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT SADAT FEELS HE HAS GONE QUITE FAR IN GIVING US IMPORTANT INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY ON WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUES AND I BELIEVE THE CHANCES ARE EXCEEDINGLY SLIM THAT HE WOULD GO FURTHER ALONG THE LINES YOU SEEK IN THE ABSENCE OF MORE SPECIFIC INDICATION OF WHAT HE WOULD GET IN RETURN.

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-- I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE IS A CHANCE THAT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE FIRM COMMITMENTS ON THESE POINTS IF WE COULD INFORM HIM OF ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO GIVE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS WE HAVE PUT TO YOU. IN OTHER WORDS, I THINK SADAT WOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY AN ARRANGEMENT THAT INVOLVED A FIRM QUID PRO QUO, BUT HE WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS ON THE BASIS OF DAYAN'S "BEST EFFORT" REASSURANCES ALONE.

-- WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SEEK THESE ANSWERS FROM SADAT, AND IN ADDITION AN ASSURANCE FROM HIM THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH DAYAN, IF DAYAN COULD TELL HIM THAT IF SADAT CAME FORWARD ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO OUR QUESTIONS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(1) ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO RESOLVE DEFINITELY THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AT THE END OF A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

(2) THE MECHANISM BY WHICH THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WILL BE THROUGH (A) NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES DURING THE

FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD LEADING TO A FINAL AGREEMENT
BASED ON ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF UN RESOLUTION 242, WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING IN THE TERRI-
TORIES PARTICIPATING IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS; AND (B) AN
APPROPRIATE EXPRESSION OF APPROVAL OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE

NEGOTIATIONS BY THE PEOPLE LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES.

-- THE UNDERSTANDING ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE THAT ITS COMMIT-
MENT WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON THE OTHER SIDE COMING FORWARD
IN PARALLEL AND SIMULTANEOUS FASHION. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE
TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EXPLORATION OF THIS EXCHANGE
WOULD BE KEPT SECRET UNTIL IT IS CONCLUDED AND THAT IF
EITHER SIDE SOUGHT TO PORTRAY PUBLICLY THE OTHER AS HAVING
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MADE UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS IT WOULD BE DENIED BY THE OTHER
SIDE.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE FINAL COMMENT. ALTHOUGH WE
HAVE RECEIVED INDICATIONS OF SADAT'S FLEXIBILITY ON THESE
VARIOUS POINTS AS INDICATED ABOVE, MOST HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO
US IN THE CONTEXT OF SADAT'S ASSUMPTION THAT ISRAEL WILL
BE ABLE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS TO
MAKE A PEACE SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE. HE WILL SEE IT AS A
MORE FAR-REACHING STEP FOR HIM TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO THESE
POSITIONS AT THIS INITIAL STAGE, AND IN TAKING THEM HE WILL
BE CONCERNED THAT HE IS PLACING HIMSELF IN AN EVEN MORE
VULNERABLE POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARABS. HE WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY SEE HIMSELF AS JUSTIFIED SEEKING, IN RETURN,
A SIGNIFICANT STEP FROM ISRAEL TO MAKE THESE CONCESSIONS
PLAUSIBLE IN THE EYES OF EGYPTIAN AND ARAB PUBLIC OPINION.

2. ON EXPLAINING TO BEGIN WHY WE ARE NOT DELIVERING THE
EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, YOU
SHOULD SAY (BUT NOT GO BEYOND THIS) THAT THE EGYPTIANS
HAVE DECIDED TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THEIR DRAFT BEFORE
GIVING IT TO US. VANCE

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